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RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN NORTH CAROLINA
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE*
PART I
Restraint of Trade is an expression loosely used concerning a wide
range of business arrangements from giant trusts and combinations
down to the simple covenants of small merchants not to compete with
those who buy them out.'
The legality of these various arrangements has frequently been
called in question and has often been a matter of great public concern,
especially where the effect of the arrangement is either to force
down the price paid to the producer of farm and other elemental
products or to advance the cost of staples to the consumer 2
It is proposed here to examine the state of the North Carolina
law on certain types of restraints against a background of selected
cases elsewhere.
CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE
Superficially it would seem that a man might as well bind himself
for a good consideration not to sell cigarettes as not to smoke them
and that he might do so without regard to whether or not he had pre-
viously dealt in those articles.
But in the formative period of the law when a man could change
occupations only with difficulty and when, if he changed towns, he
was pointed at suspiciously by the new-village dames and sniffed at
suspiciously by the new-village dogs, there was a decided policy
against upholding a covenant by worker or tradesman not to engage
in his accustomed business in his home town even if he was paid
something for it. The aptest and most cited illustration of that
policy on the bench is the tirade of a fifteenth century judge against
a plaintiff seeking to recover the penalty for breach of a covenant
binding a dyer not to practice his craft in one town for six months.3
Out of that antagonistic attitude toward all restraint on trade later
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1See Holmes, J., dissenting in Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S.
197, 404, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 469 (1904) distinguishing "contracts in restraint of
trade" from "combinations in restraint of trade" at Common Law.
. 'See Clark, C. J., in Morehead City Sea Food Co., Inc. v. Way, 169 N. C.
679, 86 S. E. 603 (1915)-coast fisheries.
IHull, J., in Anonymous Case, Y. B. Hen. V, foL. 5, .1)1. 26 (1415). And
see The Blacksmith's Case, 2 Leo. 210 (1587, C. P.).
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grew the modified rule that, while restraining contracts were printa
facie bad, it might be shown that they were reasonable, and, if so,
they were enforceable. This rule has been otherwise phrased as fol-
lows: that the restraint must be "such only as to afford a fair pro-
tection to the interests of the party in favour of whom it is given,.
and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public."4
The types of restraint to which the latter part of the rule is di-
rected-those which are thought to violate the public interest-are
chiefly of these sorts:
(1) Creation of monopoly.
(2) Disabling public utilities from serving the public.
(3) Buying off of threatened competition.
CREATING MONOPOLY
Monopolies were opposed to the common law and have been con-
demned in the United States by statutes both state and federal.5 It
can of course be no justification for such organizations that they are
created by means of an otherwise justifiable agreement not to compete
instead of by pool, trust, or conspiracy. The detailed consideration
of that matter is reserved for a separate topic, but it is here noted
that the question of monopolistic control was involved in several of
the North Carolina cases considered in this paper and that in one or
'Language of Tindal, C. J., in Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1831, C. P.) ;
Merriman v. Cover, 104 Va. 428, 57 S. E. 817, 819 (1905); Mar-Hof Co. v.
Rosenbacher, 176 N. C. 330, 97 S. E. 169 (1918). The doctrine which also pre-
vailed in England for some time that the restraint to be valid must not be
general, i.e., cover the entire jurisdiction [Mitchell v. Reynolds, infra, note 9,
McAuliffe v. Vaughan, 135 Ga. 852, 70 S. E. 322, 324 (1911) ; Brown v. Wil-
liams, 144 S. E. 256 (Ga. 1928), under code; cf. Fry, J., in Rousillon v. Rousil-
Ion, 14 Ch. Div. 351, 366 (1880)] will not be discussed herein since aside from
some recitals of the rule in that form, [Mar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacher, supra;
Shute v. Heath, 131 N. C. 281, 42 S. E. 704 (1902)] the doctrine seems never
to have had any place in North Carolina law, [see Cowan v. Fairbrother, 119
N. C. 406, 24 S. E. 212 (1896) ; Morehead City Case, supra note 2]. Though it
has been tenaciously adhered to in some American jurisdictions since its aban-
donment in England. See, e.g., Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringelli, 57 Ohio St. 596,
49 N. E. 1030 (1898). The reason which might justify the rule in England,
i.e., that a covenantor would have to ecpatriate himself in order to pursue hig
accustomed line of business, has little pertinance when applied to people in the
various states of this country. But see Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen.370, 375;
(Mass., 1866). Occasionally when a covenant is unlimited as to space only be-
cause of an apparent oversight of the parties, a liberal court will uphold the
covenant as far as it would have been clearly proper to stipulate. See illiterate
unlimited covenant in Fox v. Barbee, 146 Pac. 364 (Kans., 1915).
SC. S. N. C. §§2559-2574; U. S. C. A. Tit. 15, §1.
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two instances the final result depended more upon that factor than
on the question of how the restraint affected the covenantor.6
RESTRAINING PUBLIC UTILITIES
It has been recognized in North Carolina as elsewhere that a coy-
,enant by a public utility not to engage in the business for which it
:has been established is unenforceable. Some effort was made by
counsel to use this doctrine in a later case to overthrow the covenant
of a livery stable proprietor who sold out and then competed con-
trary to his agreement, the argument apparently being that the livery
-business was of a public character like a street car line or bus system.
The court missed the point entirely and so ruled against the con-
struction. But the argument was unsound anyway since, first, the
livery in question was probably not a public service business and,
second, if it were such, it would not be one of the type which owes
any franchise duty to the public to continue operations and a self-
imposed restraint would therefore not run afoul of the public
interest.8
FORESTALLING COMPETITION
Buying off threatened competition, that is, paying a man not to
engage in a business in which he is not then engaged, has always been
regarded as illegal.9 Whether under changed economic conditions
there is any need for this check on freedom of contract or not has
sometimes been doubted. Perhaps less economic loss to a community
"In Shute v. Shute, 176 N. C. 462, 97 S. E. 392, 393 (1918), point is made
of the fact that the parties "ginned at least 80% of the cotton ginned in
!Ionroe."
'Cowan v. Fairbrother, supra note 4; Nat. Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital
C 45 Minn. 272, 47 N. W. 806 (1891).So held as to hotels in Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 60 Nebr. 583, 83 N. W.
842 (1900) ; but cf. Clemons v. Meadows, 123 Ky. 178, 94 S. W. 13 (1906).
Ginning-the business with which the case of Shute v. Shute, supra note 6, was
concerned seems to be a public utility in respect of rate regulation in some
states; see e.g., II Comp. Stat. Okla. (1921), §§3712 and 1114, but not in
respect of compulsory service.
" "All contracts, where there is a bare restraint of trade and no more, must
be void." Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wmsz 181, 192 (1711, K. B.) ; Gross-Kelly
Co. v. Bibo, 19 N. M. 495, 145 Pac. 480 (1914). There is language in the
_pleadings reported in two cases suggesting otherwise but the cases do not bear out
the language. Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223, 5 Am. Dec. 102 (1811) ; Leslie v.
Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519, 18 N. E. 363 (1888). A bare covenant to retire from
business without a sale of good will to the covenantee has likewise been treated
as unenforceable. Shute v. Shute, supra note 6. But in the language of Mr.
Justice Holmes, "The covenant makes the sale." Cinti. P., B. S. & P. Pkt. Co.
v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 26 Sup. Ct. 208 (1906). See also Brett v. Ebel, 51 N. Y.
Supp. 593, 29 App. Div. 256 (1898).
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would come of letting one dry goods merchant buy off a newcomer
before he opened a competing shop than of forcing the former to
wait till the competitor had put his money into a lease, fixtures and a
stock which might become useless, and had hired people who might
then be suddenly thrown out of work when the deal was finally made.
There is something to be said for keeping business running smoothly
rather than legally contributing to unnecessary expansions and un-
settling contractions. The dangers of extortion and other bogeys
loom up, however, when any such views are expressed, and in the
absence of a direct pronouncement by North Carolina authority, the
law is probably to be understood as orthodox in this particular.
But if the covenant is an incident to some other valid transaction,
the law may not be so hostile. The various kinds of contracts in
chief to which the covenant -in restraint of trade may attach itself
for support will now be considered.
COVENANTS ACCOMPANYING THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
OR PROFESSION
If the law were what it once seemed to be, that no one could
covenant himself out of any trade for any time or place or reason,10
it is evident that the owner of a small business might be embarrassed
about selling it at a fair going-concern price, simply because he might
later without legal restraint return to the neighborhood and regain
his old customers. 1 And the better the man and the more successful
the business, the worse off he would be as to a sale on that very
account. In the light of these facts, the dismal pictures of idle trades-
men and their mendicant offspring which the courts had painted in
early cases gave way to statements of the doctrine that a man might
guarantee not thereafter to injure what he sold and that since the
business consisted not only of goods but of good will he might cov-
enant not to do acts which would injure the buyer's enjoyment of the
good will. 12 A seller's covenant not to compete, assuming no public
10 "This condition is against law, to prohibit or restrain any to use a lawful
trade at any time or in any place." Colgate v. Bachelor, Cro. Eliz. 872 (1596),
(Y. B.)
Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813 (1896) ; Trenton Potteries v,
Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 307, 43 Atl. 723 (1899).
' Some courts have indicated a willingness to imply a covenant where none
was given in such cases. Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175, 178 (1873);
Hall v. Western Steel & Iron Wks., 227 Fed. 588, 594 (C. C. A. 7, 1915), per
Baker, Cir. J. And there is much business justice in such a view since the
buyer has very little to show for his expense in purchasing "good will" if he
must try to sustain it against the competition of the person with whom the
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interest to be involved as by the creation of a monopoly, may there-
fore lawfully be made an incident of the sale of a going business.
The law is thoroughly established today on that point in North Caro-
lina' 3 and elsewhere. 14 And a similar rule obtains in the profess-
ions 15 though it has not had universal acceptance.16 But since the
theory of this rule was protection of the good will transferred, it
followed that a covenant restraining the seller in a larger area than
that covered by his good will was not warranted and would be un-
reasonable and illegal.
ExTENT OF GOOD WiLt CONVEYED
What then determines the extent of the good will which is being
protected? Geographically speaking, a business has good will in the
places where it has made sales. A few sporadic sales, however, out
at a considerable distance beyond the normal sales territory ought
not to justify the inclusion of that area and all the space between.
The question is eminently practical. In a business sense what was
good will is associated in the mind of the buying public. But the general rule
is contra, subject only to the very ineffective restriction on the seller against
singling out and soliciting old customers directly. Trego v. Hunt, L. R.
[1896] App. Cas. 7 (H. of L.); Von Bremen v. Mac Monnies, 200 N. Y. 41,
93 N. E. 186 (1910) ; Meyers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 20 N. W.
545, 548 (1884); Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 189, 81 S. E. 1096, 1099 (1914),
semble. And where the contract of sale is in writing parole evidence has been
held inadmissible to establish an accompanying covenant not to compete. Diller
v. Schindler, 263 Pac. 277 (Cal. App., 1928) ; thohgh seemingly it would be to
explain an ambiguity. Faust v. Rohr, supra, and in the absence of a written
contract in chief there is no requirement of common law that the agreement
not to compete be in writing. Wooten v. Harris, 153 N. C. 43, 68 S. E: 898
(1910). Since 1913, however, there has been such a requirement by statute in
North Carolina. C. S. §2562.
'Kramer v. Old, supra note 11. C. S. §2563, -par. 6, dealing with certain
illegal restraints adds the following proviso:
"That nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a person, firm or cor-
poration from selling his or its business and good will to a competitor, and
agreeing in writing not to enter the business in competition with the purchaser
in a limited territory, as is now allowed under the common law: Provided, such
agreement shall not violate the principles of the common law against trusts
and shall not violate the provisions of this chapter."
Even before this proviso was added to the law, the court had interpreted
the statute as not applicable to an ordinary sale-of-business covenant not to
compete. Wooten v. Harris, 153 N. C. 43, 68 S. E. 898 (1910).
" Kochenrath v. Christman, 180 Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (1918) ; Mapes v.
Metcalf, 10 N. D. 601, 88 N. W. 713 (1901y and citations.
" Cowan v. Fairbrother, supra note 4, semble; Hauser v. Harding, 126 N. C.
295, 35 S. E. 586 (1900) ; Ryan v. Hamilton, 205 Ill. 191, 68 N. E. 781 (1903) ;
McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. 51 (1868), cited with approval in Kramer v. Old,
.supra note 11.
" See Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S. E. 735 (1898), where restraint
was unlimited as to time.
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the extent of the seller's sales territory? Over what area has he
created an appreciable inclination on the part of the public to patronize
him? This question suggests that good will created by advertising
in areas not yet sold may be pertinent and there is excellent authority
for that view,' 7 though the question does not seem to have been pre-
sented in this state. But mere general favorable reputation, unsup-
ported by actual business transactions, does not supply the element
of good will.' 8 Otherwise such stores as those of Marshall Field &
Co. and John Wanamaker would have worldwide good will.'9
One other point in connection with the geographic extent of good
will seems frequently to be overlooked. Good will necessarily arises
from contact with the public; hence it is most often an asset of the
sales force.2 0 A manufacturer who sells out occasionally gives a
contract not again to mnufacture similar wares in the area covered
by the good will he has sold.21 This covenant is not exactly phrased.
What is desired to prevent is sales in the territory delineated and not
the manufacture in that area of goods for sale in some distant new
market-a matter of no proper concern to the covenantee. Some
point was made of this distinction in a famous Massachusetts case
which raised the issue, so to speak, the other way around. Here a
manufacturer who had contracted his entire output to one concern
and who in consequence was not known to the public, sold his busi-
ness and gave a covenant which restrained him from manufacturing
and selling. Of course such a manufacturer would have a sort of
inchoate good will with the trade which would become operative
1? Hall v. Western, supra note 12. See also Western Oil Ref'g. Co. v. Jones,
27 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 6, 1928), a trade name case in which it was said:
"Those limitations, in our opinion, do not exclude territory which may be
reasonably expected to be within the normal expansions of the business." Cf.
Nat. Gro. Co. v. Nat. Stores Corp., 123 At. 740 (N. J. Ch., 1924), also a trade
name case.
"See article on Good Will by Prof. Floyd A. Wright, to appear in (May,
1929) 23 ILL. L. Rav.
' There can of course be worldwide good will in a business of international
character. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Amm. Co., Ltd. [1894],
A. C. 535 (Eng. H. of L.).
' It may be associated with purchases also.. In the Morehead City case,
supra note 2, the middlemen in the fisheries industry would have good will of
both types through purchases from the fishermen and sales to the trade. But
either way, dealing with the public is necessary.
' See covenant quoted in Trenton Potteries v. Olyphant, supra note II; also
Western Woodenware Assn. v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 604 (1890).
Literally the restraint in Cowan v. Fairbrother, supra note 4, would prevent
the seller of a newspaper from doing the printing for a magazine for circula-
tion in other parts of the United States, but its obvious purpose was otherwise
made clear.
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when his then existing entire-output contract terminated. He might
even have good will indirectly with the public if his selling agency
marketed the product under his, the manufacturer's name. But the
court treated him as a seller of plant only and not of a business and
good will and accordingly refused on this ground, among others, to
uphold the restraint.2 2
The next proposition is that the restraint must not cover lines of
business other than those. sold, since the seller's good will measures
the restraint. A local shoe dealer in Chapel Hill, conveying to a
clothing store, can legally covenant to restraint himself from selling
shoes, but not clothing or groceries. His good will no more extends
to these matters than it extends geographically to Kalamazoo. There
would seem to be a good deal of sound sense, however, in relaxing
this rule slightly where the restraining covenant covers in addition
only closely related lines such as perhaps the public might have ex-
pected to obtain from the business whose good will was transferred,
and there is an American decision of high authority for doing so. 2s
In view of the observations first made, however, a covenant re-
straining the seller "from competing with the buyer" is likely to be
held unreasonable inasmuch as the buyer may be a dealer already
engaged in much broader operations than the seller or he may expand
into new lines and territory during the period of the covenant and
the seller would in consequence be prevented from engaging in busi-
ness of a character or in a location where he had no previous good
will.2 4 As to these restraints the deal would amount to buying off
' Gamewell Fire-Alarm Tel. Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 35 N. E. 98 (1893).
Holmes, J., in Anchor Elec. Co. v. Hawkes, 178 Mass. 101, 50 N. E. 509,
511 (1898) where the selling companies consolidated into a new company
whose type of business was slightly broader than that of the separate com-
panies. In Cowan v. Fairbrother, supra.note 4, the seller transferred a.news-
paper business. The covenant given ws that he "shall not edit, print, or con-
duct a newspaper or magazine . . . in the state," but no point was inade of
this. Likewise in Bradshaw v. Millikin where the covenant given by a retiring
barber was not to engage "in the same or any similar biesiness". in Hamlet,
N. C. Might this language not cover a beauty or hairdressing parlor? Again
resorting to the analogy of trade name protection (note 17, supra) and its
broadening policy first along closely related lines, see Aunt Jemima Mills Co.
v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 159 C. C. A. 461 (2d Cir., 1917), certiorari denied,
245 U. S. 672, 38 Sup. Ct. 222 (1917); (1927) 75 U. PA. L. REV. 197.; Goble,
Where and What a Trade Mark Protects, 22 ILL. L. R. 379 (1927).
' See Samuel Stores, Inc., v. Abrams, 108 Atl. 541 (Conn., 1919), although
this was an employer-employee contract as to which the rules are more strict.
"Appellant contends that such contracts were reasonably required to protect it,,
not only in the areas in which the business it purchased of respondents had
been carried on, but also in other states to which it might extend that business.
But this contention I deem to be inadmissible." Magie, C. J., in Trenton Pot-
teries Case, supra note 11.
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his threatened competition, the vice of which has already been
mentioned.
Finally, the question of whether a restraining covenant is reason-
able or not is held to be one of law for the court 25 and under that
rule 'the Supreme Court of North Carolina has passed upon the valid-
ity of a large number of different agreements which will be sum-
marized in the margin. 26
'Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66 (1884); Shute v. Heath, 131 N. C. 281,
42 S. E. 704 (1902). Since most of the complaints are for equitable relief,
there is little occasion to try out the mechanics of this rule in actual practice
and no opportunity to see whether all it means is that the court will leave it to
the jury to say whether the restraint provided did in fact reach spacially beyond
the good will area of the business. New Jersey has phrased the rule differently.
"If a contract having the scope' suggested does not impose an unreasonable
restraint upon trade, it would seem that the question whether the area which
was embraced in a given contract was greater than was required for the full
protection of the vendee must ordinarily be one of fact to be determined by
the jury." Fleckenstein Bros. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. Law 613, 616, 71 Atl.
265, 267 (1908). -It is believed, however, that the two apparently differing
rules will work out to the same result in actual operation.
"In the following cases the restraint was limited to one town and was
treated as valid by the court: Baumgarten v. Broadaway, 77 N. C. 8 (1877),
photography, Charlotte-10 years; Baker v. Cordon, 86 N. C. 116 (1882), drugs,
Tarboro--while plaintiff is in the business; Jefferson Reeves & Co. v. Sprague,
114 N. C. 647, 19 S. E. 707 (1894), drugs, Waynesville-3 years; King v.
Fountain, 126 N. C. 196, 35 S. E. 427 (1900), livery, Greenville-3 years;
Disosway v. Edwards, 134 N. C. 254, 46 S. E. 501 (1904), sale of liquor, New
Bern-20 years; Anders v. Gardner, 151 N. C. 604, 66 S. E. 665 (1910), livery,
Gastonia-no time limit; Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 81 S. E. 1096 (1914),
barber, Monroe-so long as plaintiff carried on business; Finch Bros. v. Mich-
ael, 167 N. C. 322, 83 S. E. 458 (1914), grocery, Lexington-l2 years; Brad-
shaw v. Millikin, 173 N. C. 432, 92 S. E. 161 (1917), barber, Hamlet-2 years.
In the following cases the restraint was over a broader area. The holding is
indicated: Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813 (1896), milling, "in the
vicinity of Elizabeth City"-no time limit, valid and restraining order proper
over whole named territory; Wooten v. Harris, 153 N. C. 43, 68 S. E. 898
(1910), merchandising, "in the town of Falkland or near enough there to inter-
fere with plaintiff's business'--no time limit, held good as to Falkland at least,
that being all that was necessary to enjoin defendant; Hauser v. Harding, 126
N. C. 295, 35 S. E. 586 (1900), physician, "territory surrounding Yadkinville"-
forever, good as to Yadkinville, remaining area too indefinite, not too broad;
Shute v. Shute, 176 N. C. 462, 97 S. E. 392 (1918), ginning, part of Monroe
County-10 years, invalid, declared by Clark, C. J., to be too large and too
long, though case seems to have been decided on other grounds, see note 6,
supra; Cowan v. Fair-brother, 118 N. C. 406, 24 S. E. 212 (1896), newspaper,
State of N. C. as to one defendant, Durham County as to the other-10 years,
held good; Morehead City Sea Food Co. v. Way, 169 N. C. 679, 86 S. E. 603
(1915), fish buying at coast, 100 miles of Morehead City-10 years, valid,
Clark, C. J., dissenting on account of "great space" but chiefly on the ground
that a monopoly was created. See also Shute v. Heath, note 27 infra, and
Teague v. Schaub, note 29 infra. In the above summary of cases both the
time and space limitations are stated. The time limitations are unimportant in
North Carolina and covenants which are unlimited in this particular will be
upheld for the lifetime of the covenantor. Sliute v. Heath, note 27 infra. In
only one case does the court seem to suggest that any period of time would be
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RESTRAINTS OF INDEFINITE EXTENT
A covenant restraining the seller "from competing with the
buyer" was shown above to be open to the objection of being too
extensive; hence unreasonable. It might be open to anofher charge,
that of being too indefinite to secure judicial approval, and such
was the decision in North Carolina where the agreement was not
again to engage in the business sold "in any territory now occupied
by them or from which they secure their patronage, so as to compete
with them or injure their business .... '"27 And to its condemnation
of this limitation as incapable of ascertainment, the court added the
unnecessarily strict requirement "that the limitation as to space shall
be so definitely set out in the contract as that the bounds must be de-
termined by the same rules as apply to the description of real estate in
deeds."
The court distinguished Kramer v. Old 2s wherein the limitation
upheld was "in or in the vicinity of Elizabeth City," on the ground
that the point had not there been raised.
The question of indefiniteness had been presented in one previous
case by the language of a covenant not to practice medicine "in the
territory sorrounding Yadkinville," which was held inoperative on
that ground as to all but the named town.29
so long as to affect the validity of a restraining covenant. Shute v. Shute,
supra. And this was not the principal reason, nor even seemingly an important
one, for the adverse decision in that case. In some other jurisdictions, how-
ever, the time element is considered, and if regarded as too extensive, becomes
the deciding factor against the covenant. See note 16, supra.
Shute v. Heath, 131 N. C. 281, 42 S. E. 704 (1902) ; cf. Boggs v. Friend,
77 W. Va. 531, 87 S. E. 873 (1916).
nSupra note 11.
Hauser v. Harding, supra note 26. In Teague v. Schaub, 133 N. C. 458, 45
S. E. 762 (1903), the parties being partners in the practice of medicine "at
Roxboro and the territory adjacent thereto" agreed inter alia that at a fixed
date S would locate elsewhere "if the field is not larger than. now." The trial
judge being of opinion that "the contract . . . was indefinite as to territory
and could not be aided by extrinsic evidence," gave judgment for defendant
who had not located elsewhere as agreed. Held, no error. The followdlng
arguments could be advanced: (1) That "territory adjacent!' is too indefinite.
This contention is sustainable. Hauser v. Harding, supra. (2) That "Rox-
boro" is too indefinite, if as contended, it is an unincorporated town. (See dis-
senting opinion, 133 N. C. 465, 45 S. E. 764.) This would be an incompre-
hensible refinement. (3) That the condition on which he was to depart, i.e.,
"if the field is not larger than now," is too indefinite. This seems to be the
real ground of the decision in the Supreme Court, though not the ground of
the judgment at trial. Cf. Ryan v. Hamilton, supra note 15, wherein defendant
agreed not to reenter practice "unless forced to do so by some unforseen cir-
cumstances."
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SEVERABILITY
Assume a covenant clearly covering too broad an area but describ-
ing the territory in sections thus: "in the city or county of Durham
or elsewhere in North Carolina." How will such a phrase be dealt
with when the good will extends only to Durham? There are two
obvious arguments for holding it bad entirely, i.e., that to do other-
wise is to make a contract for the parties, and also to invite excess-
ively large restraints and put the courts to a determination of the
most that would be good on the fact disclosed. The answers, be they
sufficient or not, are that the judically made (or modified) contract
approximates the one made by the parties and is certainly more satis-
factory to one whose protection is in question than entire loss of
protection would be, and the other party ought not to object to a law-
ful restraint which is less than he agreed upon voluntarily and for
which he has been paid.8
North Carolina seems distinctly to have adopted this doctrine and
even extended it to a case where the language was not clearly sever-
able--"the territory surrounding Yadkinville" being held good as to
Yadkinville.31 Here is the insurance policy for the uncertain lawyer.
Can he safely stipulate for a little added protection for his client?
Let him subdivide the fringes with care and the doctrine of sever-
ability comes in to produce a variable limit adjustable to the views
of any future court.
CONTRACTS APPORTIONING TRADE
Assuming a contract in restraint of trade to be properly limited
in all the respects mentioned above, is it the worse because it effects
an apportionment of certain business between the two parties. Thus,
suppose A and B each operates a grocery and meat market in Dur-
ham and A conveys to B his meat business in exchange for B's gro-
cery business, each taking from the other a properly limited covenant
not to engage further in the line of business he had sold. The effect
is that the grocery and meat business which they had together done
in Durham is apportioned between them so that each is specialized
in his future trade. Should that result make the covenants unenforce-
-o For examples of opposite and technical extremes in opinion on this sub-ject, Cf. Trenton Potteries Case, supra note 11, with More v. Bonnett, 40 Cal.
251 (1870). See also 2 EDDY, COMBINATIONS, §789.
'Hauser v. Harding, supra note 26; accord Wooten v. Harris, supra note
26. In both of these cases the covenant was severed so as to drop an indefinite
excess area, but nothing appears properly to turn on that fact.
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able? Certainly the covenants are reasonable as to the parties them-
selves. It is here that a different element is introduced, i.e., reason-
ableness as to the public welfare, which has heretofore been mentioned
briefly. In the case of a single sale to a stranger the same number
of shops are usually continued in operation. The present device re-
duces the number by one in each class of trade. But in the absence
of creating a monopoly, there seeris to be no public harm from that
fact, and so certain courts seem to have viewed the matter.82 The
same result would lawfully follow- if one shop bought out another,
consolidated the stocks under one roof and then closed up the vacant
establishment.33 But there is language in one North Carolina case
and a decision in another to be reckoned with, at least where neces-
saries of life are concerned. Although the facts are not entirely dis-
closed in the first of these,3 4 it appears that two brokers dealing com-
petitively in flour and meats entered into an agreement whereby one
relinquished the flour business and the other did likewise as tor his
trade in meats in a designated area. What this obviously amounts
to is a sale by each of a portion of his business to the other. As an
apportionment of trade, it is hard to see why this- arrangement is
unreasonable. True the court speaks of the deal as if it enabled the
remaining party to charge the public his own price for the product
of which he was given the sale, but there seems to have been no evi-
dence that there were not plenty of other dealers, either selling that
territory or- willing to enter if the price were raised,3 5 and in the
absence of evidence that a monopoly is created, or likely to result
from such an exchange, the public advantage may lie in specialization
and its resulting economies, and the public interest may be best served
by seeing a square deal between the parties. The real illegality of
the reciprocal covenants under consideration and the sound ground
for the decision of the court was not the apportionment but the fact
that these brokers were agents of certain competitive millers and
Wickens v. Evans, 3 Younge & J. 318 (Exch., 1829), apportionment of
territory; Nat. Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., supra note 7, apportionment of
lines of business.
U. S. Chem. Co. v. Prov. Chem. Co., 64 Fed. 946 (E. D. Mo., 1894). Cf.
Western Woodenware Assn. v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 604 (1890),
contra because of some evidence of monopoly and also in support of home
industries.
Culp v. Love, 127 N. C. 457, 37 S. E. 476 (1900).
" See remark of Faircloth, C. J., in King v. Fountain, supra note 26, "The
restriction applies to one individual only, and it is quite -probable that, if the
demands of that place require more extensive livery business, some other enter-
prising citizen will supply the demand, especially if it be profitable."
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their secret deal between themselves constitutes a shameless fraud on
the principal of one or both. Without resort to any question of
restraint of trade or monopoly, therefore, the court could quite prop-
erly have refused to enforce such an agreement for one of the dis-
honest parties to it. It is true that apportionment cases require per-
haps closer scrutiny than the ordinary type as they are more likely
to result in monopoly, but where such is not shown to be the result,
it would seem that they are well governed by the ordinary rules re-
garding contracts not to compete.
The other North Carolina case was as follows: Two brothers, each
apparently operating a cotton ginning plant in Monroe, entered into
reciprocal agreements substantially on these terms. A sold his plant
to B and agreed not to operate thereafter for ten years in the part
of the county south of Bear Skin Creek. B, instead of selling his
plant in turn to A, agreed to dismantle and remove it and not to oper-
ate for a like period in the part of the county north of the creek.
This arrangement apportions the territory between them. Suit was
upon the second part of the contract to enjoin the erection by B of a
new gin, contrary to his promise. It was held invalid 8 0 If the first
only of these agreements were considered, it would appear to be a
rather narrowly limited restraint accompanying a sale of business0 7
Though good will was not specifically mentioned, it would seem to be
properly regarded as transferred since the seller's agreement to with-
draw and refrain from competition would leave the buyer the benefit
of the seller's customers so far as he could get and keep them. In the
language already quoted from Mr. Justice Holmes, "The covenant
makes the sale."3 8  Under the ordinary rules heretofore considered
this single restraint probably would be held valid.
Looking now at the other side of the deal, we find that B sold no
plant or tangible property to A, but closed it down for A's benefit and
added a covenant that he would not for ten years engage in the busi-
ness in a designated part of the county. An agreement to relinquish
business in favor of another is not the less a transfer of the business
because no property is delivered to the buyer. 9 He may not want
the plant. And, of course, he could buy the plant, business, and good
' Shute v. Shute, supra note 6.
SAlthough Clark, C. J., remarked that the territory was "unnecessarily
large" and "the period of ten years was also excessive."
'Supra note 9.
Rowe v. Toon, 185 Ia. 848, 169 N. W. 38 (1918) ; Brett v. Ebel, supra note
9. And see discussion in Mapes v. Metcalf, supra note 14.
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will, take a restraining covenant and then dismantle the plant and put
it up at auction so as to conduct the operations more efficiently at
his other establishment. Unless then there is something about the
business of ginning cotton to call for rules different from those ap-
plied to drug stores or the milling business, it would seem that this
individual contract, with its moderate restraints as far as the parties
are concerned, could also properly be sustained. Clark, C. J., inti-
mated that there was a difference. He said, "This is clearly against
-public interest, which is that these ginning plants shall be multiplied
according to the needs of the public and shall not be restricted in
-number by agreement between parties in that line of business." And
further on, "A restriction as to territory which would be reasonable
in regard to issuing a newspaper which draws from a large territory
vould not apply to the prohibition of the erection of ginning plants
in which business it is burdensome to the public to haul seed cotton
any great distance to be ginned. '40
The unreasonableness he has in mind is clearly from a public
point of view. If that public risk actually exists, it would seem to be
,equal ground for invalidating a ten-year, half-county restraining cove-
nant accompanying the bona fide sale of a single cotton gin business.
But that the court will carry its view thus far may well be doubted.
And it may be that the court would sustain such a single sale and
,covenant even if the area of the restraint were increased to the whole
county.4 1 If so, it is difficult to see that the mere apportionment of
the county between two threatens any more serious injury to the citi-
zens of the state. One is tempted to think of this case in the words
,of Priest, District Judge, that "It is a nervous and alarmed imagina-
tion which sees in every transaction involving large exchange of prop-
.erties a monster threatening public interests." 42 But there are too
many elements in Shute v. Shute to permit of an accurate appraisal
of the case as authority for the future.43 It behooves counsel in the
light of that decision, however, to recite specifically the transfer of
business and good will and to avoid apportionment, especially terri-
"176 N. C. at p. 464, 97 S. E. at p. 393.
"Compare "in the vicinity of Elizabeth City," sustained as to milling busi-
ness in Kramer v. Old, supra note 11.
"U. S. Chem. Co. v. Prov. Chem. Co., supra note 33, at p. 950.
"(1) No sale of business, mere agreement to quit, (2) no sale of prop-
erty, (3) no sale of good will, (4) business of special public interest; so re-
straints must be specially limited. Cf. notes 8 and 9, supra, (5) monopoly-
see note 6, supra, (6) division of territory.
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torial apportionment wherever possible, for, whatever the argument,
there can be no question that divisions of territory are not favored
by the judges.
COVENANTS TAKEN WHEN SELLER IS CORPORATION
In this class of cases, so far as the selling corporation is con-
cerned, the rules are the same as those discussed above for individual
sellers except that the courts view them with more indifference since
an idle corporation does not lounge on a park bench, talk overthrow-
of the existing order, and leave at home a brood of wailing children
;uffering because daddy is out of work. But correspondingly the
taking of a covenant from the corporate entity not to detract from
the good will "it" has conveyed may not be a very durable protection
to the buyer since the personnel of the corporation may appear in;
new name and dress at any moment. A wise buyer therefore seeks
to obtain the endorsement of the important individuals in the cor-
poration on the restraining covenant as a bank does upon the cor-
porate note. In strict legal theory since the corporation is regarded
as a distinct person from its stockholders, it is difficult to see how
this individual restraint can be sustained. The individual, according
to this argument, is selling no good will and he should not be bound
by a covenant protecting the good will owned and conveyed by a
third person, the corporation. But the law would certainly be askew,
particularly in a court of equity, if it followed any such strict theory
based on doctrines of artificial persons, and while the cases anywhere
are not numerous, they do for the most part seemingly allow the indi-
vidual officers at least to be bound where they have signed the
covenant.44
COVENANTS BY SELLER OF CORPORATE STOCK
Closely related to the type of case just discussed is that wherein
an individual sells shares in a corporation and simultaneously gives
his covenant not to compete with the corporation in which the buyer
now becomes interested. It might be argued that the stockholder by
selling his shares conveys no good will and so canont bind himself by
a trade restraining covenant. That view follows the corporate entity
"Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 Pac. 430 (1913) ; Fee-
naughty v. Beall, 178 Pac. 600 (Or., 1919), semble; 2 Page, CoNTRaCTs, 1370,
§778. And see Hall's Safe Co. v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 146 Fed. 37
(C. C. A. 6, 1906); Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267,
28 Sup. Ct. 288 (1908).
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-theory strictly-a stockholder owning one-third of the shares owns
none of the corporate property or good will, though a partner owning
a one-third interest in a like business admittedly would have a pro
iata interest in the partnership good will.45 This line of reasoning
lias the apparent virtue of preciseness, and yet a North Carolina
case, 46 in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority else-
,vhere, 47 disregarded the view entirely and upheld a covenant by the
owner of ten shares (one-third of the capital stock) in a livery com-
pany not to engage in the livery business locally after he had sold his
interest to another. Would the same result have been reached in
case of a covenant by the seller of, say, ten shares of Southern Public
Utilities stock to protect the transportation business of its subsidiary,
the Carolina Coach Co.? That may well be doubted, and the prob-
able extent of the rule is suggested by this extreme comparison. A
stockholder's covenant not to compete with the corporation whose
stock he sells ought to be upheld only when he is the holder of a
large, if not controlling, interest, or when he occupies some office
,which makes the corporation good will appreciably dependent on him
personally. No case has been found in which this specific point was
raised, but it is believed that the decisions throughout the country
are consistent with the view expressed and that the rule of Anders v.
Gardner will be so limited when occasion arises.
ASSIGNABILITY; EFFECT OF LATER CONTRACT
Whatever may have once been the rule, it is now well settled that
lawful contracts in restraint of trade may be assigned,48 and it seems
also to have been held in one North Carolina case, not too clear on
its facts, that such a contract survives subsequent joint business trans-
actions of the parties where the originally imposed restraint is not
specifically made the subject of a new agreement.49
" Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furn. Co., 92 S. W. 1104 (Tenn., 1906).
'Anders v. Gardner, supra note 26.
"'Up-River Ice Co. v. Denler, 114 Mich. 296, 72 N. W. 157 (1897) ; Buck-
'hout v. Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 122 N. W. 184 (1909); Kronschnabel-Smith &
Co. v. Kronschnabel, 87 Minin. 230, 91 N. W. 892 (1902) ; Farmers State Bk. v.
Petersburg State Bk., 187 N. W. 117 (Nebr., 1922) ; Kradwell v. Thiesen, 131
Wis. 97, 111 N. W. 233 (1907). Contra, under Code, Chamberlain v. Augus-
tine, 172 Cal. 285, 156 Pac. 479 (1916). And see Brunswick v. Grossman,
infra note 64.
Cowan v. Fairbrother, supra note 4; Anders v. Gardner, supra note 26.
Up-River Ice Co. v. Denler, supra note 47.
"Faust v. Rohr, supra note 26. Cf. Hall Safe cases, supra note 44.
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WHAT CONSTITuTEs BREACH
When one has lawfully covenanted not to engage in a business in
a certain community, such shams as reestablishing the business in
the name of the wife or of a son or a friend will, of course, be
stricken down.50 And to enter a competitor's service as manager
has also been properly disapproved.51 It ought also to follow that
one could not hold any other position in which his personality would
materially detract from the good will he had sold.5 2
But if the defendant takes up some menial employment with a
competing company or even a less humble employment which does
not bring him into relations with the public in such a way as to
detract from the good will he previously sold, it would seem that he
should not be restrained. 8 Something might turn on the express
language of his covenant. If it provided not only against his en-
gaging in but against his aiding or assisting the conduct of a similar
business to the one he had sold, his slightest service for a competitor
would seem literally to be prohibited. It is believed, however, that
in so far as the language might seek to reach such a situation, it would
be invalid as too extensive and that the courts should interpret it
narrowly as they have seemed to do.
To ,take up another angle of the matter, what if defendant's sole
breach is becoming interested in a corporation which competes within
the forbidden area? The answer may turn on the question of what
importance he occupies in the new corporation and the kind of inter-
est he takes. A gentleman who had sold and retired to California.
and who -bought a few shares in some large competing corporation,
solely for investment would not be competing either in strict legal
' Baker v. Cordon, supra note 26, after previous competition by defendant
in his own name had been enjoined; King v. Fountain, supra note 26.
" Baker v. Cordon, supra; Jefferson v. Markert, 112 Ga. 498, 37 S. E. 75&
(1900) ; and see Stephens v. Pahl, 23 Ohio N. P. (N. S.), 377 (Cinti. Super.
ct., 1921).
Anders v. Gardner, supra note 26; Alcock v. Alcock, 267 Ill. 422, 108
N. E. 671 (1915) ; cf. dictum in Baker v. Cordon, supra note 26, that becoming
drug clerk would not have violated the restraining order which had been issued
in that case.
' See dictum cited in note 52, supra; Mitchell v. Nat. Window Cleaning Co.,
155 Ga. 245, 116 S. E. 532 (1923) ; also series of lower court decisions in Ohio
relating to express and moving, and window cleaning business. Schroeder v.
Schultze, 16 Ohio C. C. (N. S.), 303 (1908); Queen City Window Cleaning Co.
v. Davis, 37 Ohio Cir. 474 (1916) ; Lichtenstein v. Silverman, 28 0. C. A. 126
(1914). The covenant in Faust v. Rohr, supra note 26, in terms prohibited
defendant from "concerning himself in . . . conducting the business of a bar-
ber, either as principal, agent or servant."
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or practical business understanding and would consequently not be
violating his covenant in that manner. Neither, it seems, would he be
appreciably aiding such competition within the meaning of a covenant
including the extra provision already mentioned, that he would neither
directly nor indirectly engage in, or aid, or assist in the conduct of
such business; though it would seem literally within the provision
(often included) not to become interested in any such business. If,
however, he became one of the chief stockholders or a minor stock-
holder and an active official of the new concern, it is believed he
should be restrained, and the authority in this state accords with this
view. "It was, therefore, a violation of the contract .. .to take
stock in or help to organize or manage a corporation formed to com-
pete with plaintiff." 54 But merely selling goods to third party com-
petitors and taking a mortgage back for security does not constitute
a breach of a covenant not to enter the drug business.55 And, some-
what more doubtfully, neither does lending money to a competitor.56
The case might very well be otherwise if the loan was the chief
financial backing for a newly organized concern, but there is no such
suggestion in the opinion.
RELiE-F
Upon breach of the restraining covenant, the covenantee may have,
first of all, his action at law for actual damages sustained. It re-
quires no extended illustration to show that such relief is unsatis-
factory. What with the necessity of proving not only that customers
were lost to the plaintiff but that they were lost because of defendant's
competition, and the .further necessity of establishing what profit
would have come from their custom, the action promises to cost more
than it yields.57
If he has stipulated for liquidated damages, plaintiff may fare
better. According to one North Carolina decision, plaintiff must
show in such a case "that some actual loss has been sustained, and
that the amount of the bond is not unreasonable."5 8 A more recent
Kramer v. Old, supra note 26.
' Reeves v. Sprague, supra note 26.
' Finch Bros. v. Michael, supra note 26; and see Stephens v. Pahl, supra
note 51.
" Plaintiff who had bought a garage, with defendant's covenant not to set
up in Reading for five years, put in evidence of a falling off of his business
and specific proof of the loss of one job. Held, insufficient to warrant jury's
finding damages to plaintiff of $781. Satz v. Lamar, 14 Berks Co. L. J. 113
(Pa. Com. PL., 1921). And see Finch Bros. v. Michael, mspra note 26.
' Disosway v. Edwards, supra note 26, which also states that the require-
ment of proof may be met by admitted allegations.
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case, however, lays down the rule as follows: "It has been the policy
of the courts to construe such an agreement as liquidated damages
rather than as a penalty, in the absence of any evidence to show that
the amount of damages claimed is unjust or oppressive, or that the
amount claimed is disproportionate to the damages that would result
from the breach." 59 At most, this distinction seems to be one of
presumptions or burden of proof, and the real substantive test of the
validity would seem to be, not whether the damages after breach total
up to the approximate amount stipulated, but whether in prospect at
the date the contract was made they looked as if they might. 0 It
would probably be impossible, however, in the application of this test
for the judge or jury to avoid being influenced by what damages
appear actually to have been inflicted.
There remains finally equitable ielief to consider. Legal relief
by way of damages being recognized as inadequate because of the
speculative character of future losses; the courts have consistently is-
sued injunctions against the violation of proper restraining cove-
nants.61 It is the rule furthermore both in North Carolina and else-
where that a provision for liquidated damages does not bar injunctive
relief, unless the language clearly shows that the covenant is in the
alternative: to abstain from competition or to pay the agreed sum as
the price for the privilege of resuming business.0 2 And it seems that
plaintiff may have both the injunction and compensation for losses
actually suffered to that date,63 this dual remedy corresponding to the
injunction and accounting in jurisdictions not under the code.
Finally, in a case where the buyer has paid in part by giving notes
to the seller conditioned upon his not re~ngaging in the business in a
certain area, the buyer may obtain indirect relief for breach of the
'Bradshaw v. Millikin, supra note 26; accord Pendleton v. Elizabeth City
Light Co., 121 N. C. 20, 27 S. E. 1003 (1897), not a restraint of trade case.
o See 2 Wi'smr, CoNTaAcrs, §§777-779.
Baumgarten, King, Cowan, Hauser and Faust cases, all in note 26, supra.
See also discussion in Jolley v. Brady, 127 N. C. 142, 37 S. E. 153 (1900), re-
straining covenant but not one accompanying sale of a going business.
'Bradshaw v. Millikin, supra note 26, and citations. See Busk v. F. Wolf
& Co., 143 Ga. 18, 84 S. E. 63 (1915).
SIbid. This holding invites a further argument. Liquidated damages are in-
tended to cover the whole period of a -possible breach by the covenantor. An
injunction granted cuts short the Bireach so that the stipulated damages should
not be given. On the other hand the actual damages suffered to the date of
the injunction are difficult to prove and this part of the relief is incomplete if
not inadequate. But prompt action by the covenantee will keep this injury to a
minimum and for all practical purposes it would seem that the Bradshaw Case
is correctly decided on this point.
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condition by resisting the payment of the notes-a proposition so
obvious that it would not be mentioned except for a very interesting
extension of it in one outside case which relieved the maker from
paying purchase money notes where the payee had violated a cove-
nant for an unlimited and hence otherwise unenforceable restraint. 64
This decision has possibilities even more attractive than injunctions
and damages to the lawyer who wishes to include in his client's
contract of purchase a restraining covenant broader than he fears
will survive a judicial test.
' Brunswick v. Grossman, 217 Il. App. 108 (1920).
